This article is about the philosophical notion of idealism. For the ethical principle, see. For other uses, see.

In, idealism is the group of philosophies which assert that reality, or reality as humans can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial., idealism manifests as a about the possibility of knowing any mind-independent thing. In contrast to, idealism asserts the primacy of consciousness as the origin and prerequisite of material phenomena. According to this view consciousness exists before and is the pre-condition of material existence. Consciousness creates and determines the material and not vice versa. Idealism believes consciousness and mind to be the origin of the material world and aims to explain the existing world according to these principles.

Idealism theories are mainly divided into two groups. Concedes the primacy of human consciousness and believes that the existing world is a combination of sensation.

Concedes the primary of an objective consciousness which exists before and independent of human ones. In a sociological sense, idealism emphasizes how human ideas—especially beliefs and values—shape society. As an doctrine, idealism goes further, asserting that all entities are composed of mind or spirit. Idealism thus rejects and theories that fail to ascribe priority to the mind. The earliest extant arguments that the world of experience is grounded in the mental derive from India and Greece. The in India and the Greek gave arguments for an all-pervading consciousness as the ground or true nature of reality. In contrast, the school, which arose within Buddhism in India in the 4th century CE, based its 'mind-only' idealism to a greater extent on analyses of personal experience.

This turn toward the anticipated such as, who revived idealism in 18th-century Europe by employing skeptical arguments against. Beginning with, such as,,, and dominated 19th-century philosophy. This tradition, which emphasized the mental or 'ideal' character of all phenomena, gave birth to idealistic and schools ranging from to to. The historical influence of this branch of idealism remains central even to the schools that rejected its assumptions, such as, and.

The sage (possibly 8th century) is one of the earliest exponents of idealism, and is a major figure in the. There are currents of idealism throughout, ancient and modern.

Hindu idealism often takes the form of or, espousing the view that a unitary is the essence or meaning of the and plurality. Buddhist idealism on the other hand is more epistemic and is not a metaphysical monism, which Buddhists consider eternalistic and hence not the between extremes espoused by the Buddha. The oldest reference to Idealism in Indian texts is in of the. This sukta espouses by presenting cosmic being Purusha as both pervading all universe and yet being transcendent to it. Absolute idealism can be seen in, where things of the objective world like the and the subjective world such as will, hope, memory etc.

Are seen to be emanations from the. Indian philosophy [ ] Idealist notions have been propounded by the schools of thought, which use the Vedas, especially the as their key texts.

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Idealism was opposed by dualists, the atomists, the logicians, the linguists and the materialists. There are various sub schools of Vedanta, like (non-dual), and Vedanta (difference and non-difference). The schools of Vedanta all attempt to explain the nature and relationship of (universal soul or Self) and (individual self), which they see as the central topic of the Vedas. One of the earliest attempts at this was Bādarāyaņa’s, which is canonical for all Vedanta sub-schools.

Advaita Vedanta is a major sub school of Vedanta which holds a non-dual Idealistic metaphysics. According to Advaita thinkers like (788–820) and his contemporary, Brahman, the single unitary consciousness or absolute awareness, appears as the diversity of the world because of maya or illusion, and hence perception of plurality is mithya, error. The world and all beings or souls in it have no separate existence from Brahman, universal consciousness, and the seemingly independent soul ( jiva) is identical to Brahman. These doctrines are represented in verses such as brahma satyam jagan mithya; jīvo brahmaiva na aparah (Brahman is alone True, and this world of plurality is an error; the individual self is not different from Brahman). Other forms of Vedanta like the of and the of are not as radical in their non-dualism, accepting that there is a certain difference between individual souls and Brahman.

The tradition of has also been categorized by scholars as a form of Idealism. The key thinker of this tradition is the Kashmirian (975–1025 CE). Modern Indian Idealism was defended by the influential Indian philosopher in his 1932 An Idealist View of Life and other works, which espouse. The essence of Hindu Idealism is captured by such modern writers as,,, and. Buddhist philosophy [ ]. Main article: Subjective Idealism ( or ) describes a relationship between experience and the world in which objects are no more than collections or 'bundles' of sense data in the perceiver. Proponents include Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, an Anglo-Irish philosopher who advanced a theory he called, later referred to as 'subjective idealism', contending that individuals can only know sensations and ideas of objects directly, not abstractions such as 'matter', and that ideas also depend upon being perceived for their very existence - esse est percipi; 'to be is to be perceived'.

Published similar assertions though there seems to have been no influence between the two contemporary writers. The only knowable reality is the represented image of an external object. Matter as a cause of that image, is unthinkable and therefore nothing to us.

An external world as absolute matter unrelated to an observer does not exist as far as we are concerned. The universe cannot exist as it appears if there is no perceiving mind.

Collier was influenced by An Essay Towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World by ' (1701). 's popular book highlights Berkeley's tautological premise for advancing idealism; 'If we say that the things known must be in the mind, we are either unduly limiting the mind's power of knowing, or we are uttering a mere tautology. We are uttering a mere tautology if we mean by 'in the mind' the same as by 'before the mind', i.e.

If we mean merely being apprehended by the mind. But if we mean this, we shall have to admit that what, in this sense, is in the mind, may nevertheless be not mental. Thus when we realize the nature of knowledge, Berkeley's argument is seen to be wrong in substance as well as in form, and his grounds for supposing that 'idea'-i.e. The objects apprehended-must be mental, are found to have no validity whatever. Hence his grounds in favour of the idealism may be dismissed.' The philosopher harshly criticized philosophical idealism, arguing that it rests on what he called 'the worst argument in the world'.

Stove claims that Berkeley tried to derive a non-tautological conclusion from tautological reasoning. He argued that in Berkeley's case the is not obvious and this is because one premise is ambiguous between one meaning which is and another which, Stove argues, is to the conclusion.

Argues that conceptual idealists compound their mistakes with use/mention confusions; Santa Claus the person does not exist. 'Santa Claus' the name/concept/fairy tale does exist because adults tell children this every Christmas season (the distinction is highlighted by using quotation-marks when referring only to the name and not the object) and proliferation of hyphenated entities such as 'thing-in-itself' (Immanuel Kant), 'things-as-interacted-by-us' (), 'table-of-commonsense' and 'table-of-physics' (Sir ) which are 'warning signs' for conceptual idealism according to Musgrave because they allegedly do not exist but only highlight the numerous ways in which people come to know the world. This argument does not take into account the issues pertaining to hermeneutics, especially at the backdrop of analytic philosophy. Musgrave criticized and philosophy in general for confusion of use and mention. And are other subjectivists.

Luce, in Sense without Matter (1954), attempts to bring Berkeley up to date by modernizing his vocabulary and putting the issues he faced in modern terms, and treats the Biblical account of matter and the psychology of perception and nature. Foster's The Case for Idealism argues that the physical world is the logical creation of natural, non-logical constraints on human. Foster's latest defense of his views is in his book A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism., a British philosopher, mystic, traveler, and guru, taught a type of idealism called, similar to that of Bishop Berkeley, proposing a master world-image, projected or manifested by a world-mind, and an infinite number of individual minds participating. A tree does not cease to exist if nobody sees it because the world-mind is projecting the idea of the tree to all minds., criticizing some versions of idealism, summarizes two important arguments for subjective idealism. The first is based on our perception of reality: (1) All we have access to in perception are the contents of our own experience and (2) The only epistemic basis for claims about the external world are our perceptual experiences therefore; (3) The only reality we can meaningfully speak of is that of perceptual experience Whilst agreeing with (2) Searle argues that (1) is false and points out that (3) does not follow from (1) and (2). The second argument runs as follows; Premise: Any cognitive state occurs as part of a set of cognitive states and within a cognitive system Conclusion 1: It is impossible to get outside all cognitive states and systems to survey the relationships between them and the reality they cognize Conclusion 2: There is no cognition of any reality that exists independently of cognition Searle contends that Conclusion 2 does not follow from the premises.

Is a subjectivist position in that holds that what one knows about an object exists only in one's mind. Proponents include. Transcendental idealism [ ]. — A383 The 2nd edition (1787) contained a Refutation of Idealism to distinguish his transcendental idealism from 's Idealism and Berkeley's anti-realist strain of. The section Paralogisms of Pure Reason is an implicit critique of Descartes' idealism. Kant says that it is not possible to infer the 'I' as an object (Descartes' ) purely from 'the spontaneity of thought'.

—, 374 Kant distinguished between things as they appear to an observer and things in themselves, 'that is, things considered without regard to whether and how they may be given to us'. We cannot approach the, the 'thing in Itself' (: Ding an sich) without our own mental world. He added that the mind is not a, tabula rasa but rather comes equipped with categories for organising our sense impressions. In the first volume of his Parerga and Paralipomena, Schopenhauer wrote his 'Sketch of a of the Doctrine of the and the '.

He defined the ideal as being mental pictures that constitute subjective. The ideal, for him, is what can be attributed to our own minds. The images in our head are what comprise the ideal. Schopenhauer emphasized that we are restricted to our own. The that appears is only a or mental picture of objects.

We directly and immediately know only representations. All objects that are external to the mind are known indirectly through the mediation of our mind. He offered a history of the of the 'ideal' as 'ideational' or 'existing in the mind as an image'. [T]rue philosophy must at all costs be idealistic; indeed, it must be so merely to be honest. For nothing is more certain than that no one ever came out of himself in order to identify himself immediately with things different from him; but everything of which he has certain, sure, and therefore immediate knowledge, lies within his consciousness. Beyond this consciousness, therefore, there can be no immediate certainty.

There can never be an existence that is objective absolutely and in itself; such an existence, indeed, is positively inconceivable. For the objective, as such, always and essentially has its existence in the consciousness of a subject; it is therefore the subject's representation, and consequently is conditioned by the subject, and moreover by the subject's forms of representation, which belong to the subject and not to the object. Main article: Schelling (1775–1854) claimed that the Fichte's 'I' needs the Not-I, because there is no subject without object, and vice versa. So there is no difference between the subjective and the objective, that is, the ideal and the real. This is Schelling's 'absolute ': the or mental images in the mind are identical to the extended objects which are external to the mind. Absolute idealism is G. Hegel's account of how existence is comprehensible as an all-inclusive whole.

Hegel called his philosophy 'absolute' idealism in contrast to the 'subjective idealism' of Berkeley and the 'transcendental idealism' of Kant and Fichte, which were not based on a critique of the finite and a dialectical philosophy of history as Hegel's idealism was. The exercise of reason and intellect enables the philosopher to know ultimate historical reality, the phenomenological constitution of self-determination, the dialectical development of self-awareness and personality in the realm of History. In his Science of Logic (1812–1814) Hegel argues that finite qualities are not fully 'real' because they depend on other finite qualities to determine them.

Qualitative infinity, on the other hand, would be more self-determining and hence more fully real. Similarly finite natural things are less 'real'—because they are less self-determining—than spiritual things like morally responsible people, ethical communities and God. So any doctrine, such as materialism, that asserts that finite qualities or natural objects are fully real is mistaken.

Hegel certainly intends to preserve what he takes to be true of German idealism, in particular Kant's insistence that ethical reason can and does go beyond finite inclinations. For Hegel there must be some identity of thought and being for the 'subject' (any human observer) to be able to know any observed 'object' (any external entity, possibly even another human) at all. Under Hegel's concept of 'subject-object identity,' subject and object both have Spirit (Hegel's ersatz, redefined, nonsupernatural 'God') as their conceptual (not metaphysical) inner reality—and in that sense are identical. Virtualbox Graphic Driver Windows 98.

But until Spirit's 'self-realization' occurs and Spirit graduates from Spirit to Absolute Spirit status, subject (a human mind) mistakenly thinks every 'object' it observes is something 'alien,' meaning something separate or apart from 'subject.' In Hegel's words, 'The object is revealed to it [to 'subject'] by [as] something alien, and it does not recognize itself.' Self-realization occurs when Hegel (part of Spirit's nonsupernatural Mind, which is the collective mind of all humans) arrives on the scene and realizes that every 'object' is himself, because both subject and object are essentially Spirit.

When self-realization occurs and Spirit becomes Absolute Spirit, the 'finite' (man, human) becomes the 'infinite' ('God,' divine), replacing the imaginary or 'picture-thinking' supernatural God of theism: man becomes God. Tucker puts it this way: 'Hegelianism... Is a religion of self-worship whose fundamental theme is given in Hegel's image of the man who aspires to be God himself, who demands 'something more, namely infinity.' ' The picture Hegel presents is 'a picture of a self-glorifying humanity striving compulsively, and at the end successfully, to rise to divinity.' Criticised Hegel's idealist philosophy in several of his works, particularly his claim to a comprehensive system that could explain the whole of reality. Where Hegel argues that an ultimate understanding of the logical structure of the world is an understanding of the logical structure of 's mind, Kierkegaard asserts that for God reality can be a system but it cannot be so for any human individual because both reality and humans are incomplete and all philosophical systems imply completeness.

A is possible but an existential system is not. 'What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational'. Hegel's absolute idealism blurs the distinction between existence and thought: our mortal nature places limits on our understanding of reality; So-called systems have often been characterized and challenged in the assertion that they abrogate the distinction between good and evil, and destroy freedom. Perhaps one would express oneself quite as definitely, if one said that every such system fantastically dissipates the concept existence. Being an individual man is a thing that has been abolished, and every speculative philosopher confuses himself with humanity at large; whereby he becomes something infinitely great, and at the same time nothing at all. A major concern of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) and of the philosophy of Spirit that he lays out in his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817–1830) is the interrelation between individual humans, which he conceives in terms of 'mutual recognition.'

However, what Climacus means by the aforementioned statement, is that Hegel, in the Philosophy of Right, believed the best solution was to surrender one's individuality to the customs of the State, identifying right and wrong in view of the prevailing bourgeois morality. Individual human will ought, at the State's highest level of development, to properly coincide with the will of the State. Climacus rejects Hegel's suppression of individuality by pointing out it is impossible to create a valid set of rules or system in any society which can adequately describe existence for any one individual. Submitting one's will to the State denies personal freedom, choice, and responsibility. In addition, Hegel does believe we can know the structure of God's mind, or ultimate reality.

Hegel agrees with Kierkegaard that both reality and humans are incomplete, inasmuch as we are in time, and reality develops through time. But the relation between time and eternity is outside time and this is the 'logical structure' that Hegel thinks we can know. Kierkegaard disputes this assertion, because it eliminates the clear distinction between and. Existence and thought are not identical and one cannot possibly think existence. Thought is always a form of abstraction, and thus not only is pure existence impossible to think, but all forms in existence are unthinkable; thought depends on language, which merely abstracts from experience, thus separating us from lived experience and the living essence of all beings. In addition, because we are finite beings, we cannot possibly know or understand anything that is universal or infinite such as God, so we cannot know God exists, since that which transcends time simultaneously transcends human understanding.

Bradley saw reality as a whole apprehended through 'feeling', a state in which there is no distinction between the perception and the thing perceived. Like Berkeley, Bradley thought that nothing can be known to exist unless it is known by a mind. We perceive, on reflection, that to be real, or even barely to exist, must be to fall within sentience.. Find any piece of existence, take up anything that any one could possibly call a fact, or could in any sense assert to have being, and then judge if it does not consist in sentient experience.

Try to discover any sense in which you can still continue to speak of it, when all perception and feeling have been removed; or point out any fragment of its matter, any aspect of its being, which is not derived from and is not still relative to this source. When the experiment is made strictly, I can myself conceive of nothing else than the experienced. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, Chapter 14 Bradley was the apparent target of 's radical rejection of idealism. Moore claimed that Bradley did not understand the statement that something is real.

We know for certain, through common sense and prephilosophical beliefs, that some things are real, whether they are objects of thought or not, according to Moore. The 1903 article The Refutation of Idealism is one of the first demonstrations of Moore's commitment to analysis. He examines each of the three terms in the Berkeleian aphorism esse est percipi, 'to be is to be perceived', finding that it must mean that the object and the subject are necessarily connected so that 'yellow' and 'the sensation of yellow' are identical - 'to be yellow' is 'to be experienced as yellow'. But it also seems there is a difference between 'yellow' and 'the sensation of yellow' and 'that esse is held to be percipi, solely because what is experienced is held to be identical with the experience of it'. Though far from a complete refutation, this was the first strong statement by analytic philosophy against its idealist predecessors, or at any rate against the type of idealism represented by Berkeley. This argument did not show that the GEM (in post–Stove vernacular, see below) is logically invalid.

Actual idealism [ ] is a form of idealism developed by that grew into a 'grounded' idealism contrasting Kant and Hegel. The idea is a version of Occam's razor; the simpler explanations are always correct. Actual idealism is the idea that reality is the ongoing act of thinking, or in Italian 'pensiero pensante'. Any action done by humans is classified as human thought because the action was done due to predisposed thought.

He further believes that thoughts are the only concept that truly exist since reality is defined through the act of thinking. This idea was derived from Gentile's paper, 'The Act of Thought of Pure Thought'.

Since thoughts are actions, any conjectured idea can be enacted. This idea not only affects the individual's life, but everyone around them, which in turn affects the state since the people are the state. Therefore, thoughts of each person are subsumed within the state. The state is a composition of many minds that come together to change the country for better or worse. Gentile theorizes that thoughts can only be conjectured within the bounds of known reality; abstract thinking does not exist. Thoughts cannot be formed outside our known reality because we are the reality that halt ourselves from thinking externally.

With accordance to 'The Act of Thought of Pure Thought', our actions comprise our thoughts, our thoughts create perception, perceptions define reality, thus we think within our created reality. The present act of thought is reality but the past is not reality; it is history. The reason being, past can be rewritten through present knowledge and perspective of the event.

The reality that is currently constructed can be completely changed through language (e. Growlanser Vi Precarious World Ps2 Iso Free. g. Bias (omission, source, tone)).

The unreliability of the recorded realty can skew the original concept and make the past remark unreliable. Actual idealism is regarded as a liberal and tolerant doctrine since it acknowledges that every being picturizes reality, in which their ideas remained hatched, differently. Even though, reality is a figment of thought. Even though core concept of the theory is famous for its simplification, its application is regarded as extremely ambiguous. Over the years, philosophers have interpreted it numerously different ways: Holmes took it as metaphysics of the thinking act; Betti as a form of hermeneutics; Harris as a metaphysics of democracy; Fogu as a modernist philosophy of history. Giovanni Gentile was a key supporter of fascism, regarded by many as the 'philosopher of fascism'.

Gentile's philosophy was the key to understating fascism as it was believed by many who supported and loved it. They believed, if priori synthesis of subject and object is true, there is no difference between the individuals in society; they're all one. Which means that they have equal right, roles, and jobs. In fascist state, submission is given to one leader because individuals act as one body. In Gentile's view, far more can be accomplished when individuals are under a corporate body than a collection of autonomous individual. Pluralistic idealism [ ] Pluralistic idealism such as that of takes the view that there are many individual minds that together underlie the existence of the observed world and make possible the existence of the physical universe. Unlike absolute idealism, pluralistic idealism does not assume the existence of a single ultimate mental reality or 'Absolute'.

Leibniz' form of idealism, known as, views 'monads' as the true atoms of the universe and as entities having perception. The monads are 'substantial forms of being, 'elemental, individual, subject to their own laws, non-interacting, each reflecting the entire universe. Monads are centers of force, which is while space, matter and motion are phenomenal and their form and existence is dependent on the simple and immaterial monads. There is a established by, the central monad, between the world in the minds of the and the external world of objects. Leibniz's cosmology embraced traditional Christian. The English psychologist and philosopher inspired by Leibniz had also defended a form of pluralistic idealism.

According to Ward the universe is composed of 'psychic monads' of different levels, interacting for mutual self- betterment. Is the view that the minds that underlie reality are the minds of persons., a philosopher at Boston University, a founder and popularizer of personal idealism, presented it as a substantive reality of persons, the only reality, as known directly in self-consciousness. Reality is a society of interacting persons dependent on the Supreme Person of God. Other proponents include and. Howison's personal idealism was also called 'California Personalism' by others to distinguish it from the 'Boston Personalism' which was of Bowne. Howison maintained that both impersonal, monistic idealism and materialism run contrary to the experience of moral freedom.

To deny freedom to pursue truth, beauty, and 'benignant love' is to undermine every profound human venture, including science, morality, and philosophy. Personalistic idealists and and realistic personal theist address a core issue, namely that of dependence upon an infinite personal God.

Howison, in his book The Limits of Evolution and Other Essays Illustrating the Metaphysical Theory of Personal Idealism, created a democratic notion of personal idealism that extended all the way to God, who was no more the ultimate monarch but the ultimate democrat in eternal relation to other eternal persons. McTaggart's idealist atheism and 's Apeirionism resemble Howisons personal idealism. Of, argued that minds alone exist and only relate to each other through love., and material objects are unreal. In he argued that time is an illusion because it is impossible to produce a coherent account of a sequence of events.

The Nature of Existence (1927) contained his arguments that space, time, and matter cannot possibly be real. In his Studies in Hegelian Cosmology (Cambridge, 1901, p196) he declared that metaphysics are not relevant to social and political action.

McTaggart 'thought that Hegel was wrong in supposing that metaphysics could show that the state is more than a means to the good of the individuals who compose it'. For McTaggart 'philosophy can give us very little, if any, guidance in action. Why should a Hegelian citizen be surprised that his belief as to the organic nature of the Absolute does not help him in deciding how to vote? Would a Hegelian engineer be reasonable in expecting that his belief that all matter is spirit should help him in planning a bridge? Thomas Davidson taught a philosophy called 'apeirotheism', a 'form of pluralistic idealism.coupled with a stern ethical rigorism' which he defined as 'a theory of Gods infinite in number.' The theory was indebted to Aristotle's pluralism and his concepts of Soul, the rational, living aspect of a living substance which cannot exist apart from the body because it is not a substance but an essence, and, rational thought, reflection and understanding.

Although a perennial source of controversy, Aristotle arguably views the latter as both eternal and immaterial in nature, as exemplified in his theology of. Identifying Aristotle's God with rational thought, Davidson argued, contrary to Aristotle, that just as the soul cannot exist apart from the body, God cannot exist apart from the world. Idealist notions took a strong hold among physicists of the early 20th century confronted with the paradoxes of and the. In, Preface to the 2nd Edition, 1900, wrote, 'There are many signs that a sound idealism is surely replacing, as a basis for natural philosophy, the crude of the older physicists.' This book influenced 's regard for the importance of the observer in scientific measurements [ ]. In § 5 of that book, Pearson asserted that '.science is in reality a classification and analysis of the contents of the mind.' Also, '.the field of science is much more than an external world.'

Sir, a British astrophysicist of the early 20th century, wrote in his book The Nature of the Physical World; 'The stuff of the world is mind-stuff'; 'The mind-stuff of the world is, of course, something more general than our individual conscious minds. The mind-stuff is not spread in space and time; these are part of the cyclic scheme ultimately derived out of it. It is necessary to keep reminding ourselves that all knowledge of our environment from which the world of physics is constructed, has entered in the form of messages transmitted along the nerves to the seat of consciousness. Consciousness is not sharply defined, but fades into subconsciousness; and beyond that we must postulate something indefinite but yet continuous with our mental nature. It is difficult for the matter-of-fact physicist to accept the view that the substratum of everything is of mental character. But no one can deny that mind is the first and most direct thing in our experience, and all else is remote inference.' The 20th-century British scientist Sir wrote that 'the Universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine.'

In his book Issues in Science and Religion (1966), p. 133, cites Arthur Eddington's The Nature of the Physical World (1928) for a text that argues The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principles provides a scientific basis for 'the defense of the idea of human freedom' and his Science and the Unseen World (1929) for support of philosophical idealism 'the thesis that reality is basically mental'. Wrote; 'The stream of knowledge is heading towards a non-mechanical reality; the Universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine. Mind no longer appears to be an accidental intruder into the realm of matter. We ought rather hail it as the creator and governor of the realm of matter.'

Jeans, in an interview published in (London), when asked the question: 'Do you believe that life on this planet is the result of some sort of accident, or do you believe that it is a part of some great scheme?' Replied: 'I incline to the idealistic theory that consciousness is fundamental, and that the material universe is derivative from consciousness, not consciousness from the material universe. In general the universe seems to me to be nearer to a great thought than to a great machine. It may well be, it seems to me, that each individual consciousness ought to be compared to a brain-cell in a universal mind. Addressing the in 1934, Jeans said: 'What remains is in any case very different from the full-blooded matter and the forbidding of the Victorian scientist. His objective and material universe is proved to consist of little more than constructs of our own minds.

To this extent, then, modern physics has moved in the direction of philosophic idealism. Mind and matter, if not proved to be of similar nature, are at least found to be ingredients of one single system. There is no longer room for the kind of which has haunted philosophy since the days of.'

In The Universe Around Us, Jeans writes: 'Finite picture whose dimensions are a certain amount of space and a certain amount of time; the protons and electrons are the streaks of paint which define the picture against its space-time background. Traveling as far back in time as we can, brings us not to the creation of the picture, but to its edge; the creation of the picture lies as much outside the picture as the artist is outside his canvas. On this view, discussing the creation of the universe in terms of time and space is like trying to discover the artist and the action of painting, by going to the edge of the canvas. This brings us very near to those philosophical systems which regard the universe as a thought in the mind of its Creator, thereby reducing all discussion of material creation to futility.'

The chemist wrote a book Intelligence Came First (1975) in which he claimed that consciousness is a fact of nature and that the cosmos is grounded in and pervaded by mind and intelligence., a French theoretical physicist best known for his work on the nature of reality, wrote a paper titled The Quantum Theory and Reality. According to the paper: 'The doctrine that the world is made up of objects whose existence is independent of human consciousness turns out to be in conflict with quantum mechanics and with facts established by experiment.'

In an article in the Guardian titled Quantum weirdness: What We Call 'Reality' is Just a State of Mind, d'Espagnat wrote: 'What quantum mechanics tells us, I believe, is surprising to say the least. It tells us that the basic components of objects – the particles, electrons, quarks etc. – cannot be thought of as 'self-existent'.' He further writes that his research in has led him to conclude that an 'ultimate reality' exists, which is not embedded in space or time. See also [ ] • • • • • • Notes [ ].

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